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July 21, 2016
Mr. Brent J. Fields
Secretary
The Honorable Mary Jo White
Chair
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549-1090
Re:

File No. S7-06-16

Dear Secretary Fields and Chair White:
The Center for International Environmental Law, Center of Concern, Environmental
Investigation Agency-US, Foundation Earth, Friends of the Earth-United States, Greenpeace
USA, Rainforest Action Network, and the Sierra Club welcome the opportunity to comment on
the recent Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) concept release on “Business and
Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K” (“Concept Release”).1 In this Comment
Letter, we address five issues: (1) the growth of socially-responsible investment (SRI) (Concept
Release questions 15, 17); (2) the definition of materiality (question 6); (3) the materiality of
sustainability information (questions 216-23); and (4) the limits of voluntary disclosure
initiatives to meet the information needs of today’s investors, both SRI investors and non-SRI
(questions 205-15, 216-18, 223). We also ask the SEC to issue mandatory sustainability
disclosure regulations and offer preliminary suggestions on the main aspects that sustainability
disclosure regulations would have to cover in order to inform investment decisions while
effectively addressing environmental, social, and governance concerns (questions 21, 23, 219).

I. Introduction
This comment letter is submitted by a number of legal and environmental organizations with
members throughout the United States. Specifically:
● Founded in 1989, the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) uses the
power of law to protect the environment, promote human rights, and ensure a just and

1

Professor Cynthia A. Williams, Osler Chair in Business Law at Osgoode Hall Law School, was the principal
author of this letter. Sachin Seth, recent law graduate from Osgoode Hall Law School, and Kaitlin Cordes and
Lauren Waugh Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment contributed to development of the letter. Additional
drafting support was provided by the Center for International Environmental Law attorneys Muriel Moody Korol
and Melissa Blue Sky, and legal interns Harjot Kaur Dhillon, and Kimberly A. Reynolds.

1

sustainable society. CIEL is dedicated to advocacy in the global public interest through
legal counsel, policy research, analysis, education, training, and capacity building.
● Center of Concern researches, educates, and advocates from Catholic social tradition to
create a world where economic, political, and cultural systems promote sustainable
flourishing of the global community.
● Founded in 1989, the Environmental Investigation Agency (US) is an international
campaigning organization focused on protecting the environment with intelligence.
Utilizing undercover investigative techniques, an extensive advocacy network, and
research and data analysis, EIA works worldwide to protect the Earth’s forests, species,
and climate for the benefit of people and wildlife.
● Founded in 2011, Foundation Earth is a think-tank – rethinking society from the ground
up. It creates reports on major steps that can be taken to produce long-term sustainability
via a true cost, zero-waste, circular economy grounded in general systems theory.
● Friends of the Earth-United States is one of 75 national member groups of Friends of
the Earth International, a global network representing more than two million activists in
75 countries. In the United States, we advocate in the halls of Congress, in state capitals,
and with community groups around the country. Our economic policy program works to
expose and challenge the economic drivers of environmental destruction and spark
transformation toward a more just and environmentally sustainable economic system.
● Greenpeace USA (Greenpeace Inc.) is the leading independent campaigning
organization that uses peaceful protest and creative communication to expose global
environmental problems and to promote solutions that are essential to a green and
peaceful future.
● Rainforest Action Network campaigns for the forests, their inhabitants and the natural
systems that sustain life by working to transform the global marketplace through
education, grassroots organizing and non-violent direct action.
● Sierra Club is the oldest and largest grassroots environmental group in the United States,
with over 1.2 million members and supporters. Sierra Club’s mission is to explore,
enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible
use of the earth’s ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and
restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to
carry out these objectives.
Each of these organizations is part of a movement of investors and the public who care
about the ecological and human impacts of investments. More directly, as stakeholders whose
work is focused on creating an economic system with core values of social justice,
environmental protection and scientific integrity, our organizations recognize that it is critical
that the capital markets operate to allocate capital to companies that are motivated to operate
consistently with those goals. Capital market regulation in the United States depends on accurate
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information to direct capital, and to date there is insufficient environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) data for the markets to function properly in this regard.2 None of the
commenting organizations think that markets alone can solve the systemic problems that drive
sustainability concerns, but we do recognize the importance of well-regulated markets in
supporting the necessary transition to a socially-just, sustainable economy.

II. SRI Investment
A. The Growth of SRI Investment
In order to understand the importance of sustainability data to investors, it is important to
take account of the rapid growth of socially-responsible impact investment (SRI), although, as
discussed below, it is by no means only, or even primarily, SRI investors who need and are
seeking better sustainability disclosure. When the SEC last considered the issue of expanded
social and environmental disclosure in a comprehensive fashion, between 1971 and 1975, there
were two active “ethical funds” which by 1975 collectively held $18.6 million, or 0.0005% of
mutual fund assets.3 Today, $6.57 trillion of assets are managed with SRI parameters in the
United States, representing close to 18% of money under professional management.4
As shown below, SRI investing has grown particularly rapidly in the past 20 years. That
trend shows no signs of abating. Investors and the public continue to display increasing concerns
about the environmental and societal impacts of business practices, both as a reflection of their
ethical values and out of a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which environmental and
social considerations can influence risk exposure and shareholder value. Thus, the factual
context in which the SEC is now considering the question of promulgating ESG disclosure
regulations is substantially different than its consideration in the early 1970s.5
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The SEC’s Concept Release uses the term “sustainability disclosure” in its request for comments, recognizing that
the term “encompasses a range of topics, including climate change, resource scarcity, corporate social responsibility,
and good corporate citizenship. These topics are characterized broadly as environmental, social, or governance
(“ESG”) concerns.” Concept Release, at 206, quoting Sustainability goes Mainstream: Insights into investor views,
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (May 2014), available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insightscenter/publications/sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-views.html; Exchange Guidance and
Recommendation—October 2015, World Federation of Exchanges (Oct. 2015), available at
http://www.sseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WFE-ESG-Recommendation-Guidance-Oct-2015.pdf. As
does the SEC, we will use the terms “sustainability” and “ESG” interchangeably to refer to the broad range of social,
environmental, or corporate governance topics that may be of concern to investors in addition to financial results in
their investing and voting decisions.
3
See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1267 (1999) (providing data showing $18.5 million of SRI assets under professional
management as of 1975).
4
US SIF Foundation, 2014 Trends Report Executive Summary: 2014 Report on Sustainable and Responsible
Investing Trends 12-13 (2014).
5
The SEC in its Concept Release relies on the logic of its 1970s examination to suggest caution regarding expanded
sustainability disclosure now; thus, the issues raised in that series of proceedings are still relevant. See Concept
Release, at 209-212; see Williams, supra note 3, at 1246-1273 (discussing and analyzing SEC proceedings in the
1970s concerning expanded social and environmental disclosure).
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B. Definition of SRI investing
SRI investing is an investment approach that actively considers ESG issues when making
and monitoring investment portfolios.6 These ESG considerations encompass a wide variety of
issues, and thus SRI investing is sometimes referred to more specifically as community
investing, ethical investing, green investing, mission-related investing, sustainable investing,
socially conscious investing, values-based investing, or impact investment, among many others.7
SRI investors typically incorporate both financial analyses and ethical and moral values into
investment and voting decisions.8
C. SRI assets under management
Data on the growth of SRI investment is available from the leading SRI industry
association, the U.S. Social Investment Forum. (To our knowledge the SEC has not published
data on this topic, nor are we aware of the SEC having studied the significance of the rapid
increase in SRI funds under management.) SRI assets under management have increased tenfold in the past 20 years; between 1995 and 2014, SRI assets under management have increased
from $639 billion to over $6.57 trillion, an increase of 929%,9 with a compound annual growth
rate of 13.1%.10 The total U.S.-domiciled assets using SRI strategies in 2014 of $6.57 trillion
comprise nearly 18% of the $36.8 trillion in assets under management in the U.S. in 2014.11
The magnitude of this rapid increase in SRI funds under management can perhaps be
appreciated from the following table:
US-domiciled assets under management engaged in sustainable,
responsible and impact investing strategies12
All professionally managed assets in the United States (SRI + nonSRI)13

1/1/2012
$3.74 trillion

1/1/2014
$6.57 trillion

$30.9 trillion

$36.8 trillion

6

Socially Responsible Investment – SRI, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sri.asp (last visited July
15, 2016).
7
SRI Basics, The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, http://www.ussif.org/sribasics (last visited
July 15, 2016).
8
Steven J. Schueth, History of SRI, The Conference on Sustainable, Responsible, Impact Investing,
http://www.sriconference.com/about/what-is-sri/history-of-sri.html (last visited July 15, 2016).
9
US SIF Foundation, supra note 4.
10
Id.
11
Id. The SIF report describes its research methodology as follows. $6.20 trillion of assets are held by 480
institutional investors, 308 money managers, and 880 community investment institutions who apply ESG criteria in
their portfolio selection. Two-hundred-and-two institutional investors and money managers who filed or co-filed
shareholder resolutions on ESG issues in publicly traded companies between 2012 and 2014 collectively held $1.72
trillion in assets. The overall $6.57 trillion total is thus calculated from combining the ESG-screened portfolio data
with the data on ESG resolution filers, and then eliminating double-counting when shareholders or asset managers
are using both strategies. Id. at 12.
12
US SIF Foundation, 2014 Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends 12 (2014),
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/disclosure-effectiveness/disclosureeffectiveness-27.pdf.
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D. Reasons for the rapid increase in SRI investment
One reason for the explosive growth in SRI investment is that many investors have
recognized that a more proactive approach to managing environmental and social issues
promotes shareholder value and a more accurate assessment of risk.14 In addition, BlackRock,
the world’s largest asset manager with $4.6 trillion of assets under management as of December
31, 2015,15 has identified four other key market drivers accelerating the SRI investing trend.
These include: shifting demographics, with younger investors desiring more positive impact
from their investments; stakeholder advocacy towards responsible investing; expanding
opportunities for SRI investment; and government policies in many countries that encourage
investment in renewable energy sources or require reporting on ESG risks.16
Students are demanding that university endowments divest from fossil fuel assets, and
endowments are listening.17 Millennials are especially driving demand to invest in more socially
responsible ways.18 They care about SRI investing after experiencing the negative effects of
irresponsible investing that led to the 2008 recession.19 Further, millennials have an expansive
sense of global political awareness from growing up with the internet and increased access to
information, and thus tend to have a greater understanding of socially responsible investments’
positive impact.20 This generation will likely grow the pool of investors who care about socially
responsible investing.21
Commenting organizations have also played a role in promoting SRI investing, and in
advocating for better, clearer, ESG data to be incorporated into the market to meet the specific
informational needs of SRI investors. CIEL has launched a report calling for credit rating
agencies to begin incorporating climate risk into credit assessments.22 CIEL also submitted
13

E-mail from Meg Voorhees, Dir. of Research, US SIF, to Cynthia Williams, Osler Chair in Business Law,
Osgoode Hall Law Sch. (July 13, 2016, 04:40PM EST) (on file with author) (data gathered by Cerulli Assoc. and
reported in US SIF Foundation, supra note 12.
14
See, e.g., CalPERS, ESG, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/investments/governance/sustainable-investing/esg (last
updated June 29, 2015); Investor Network on Climate Risk, 2012 Investor Action Plan on Climate Change Risks &
Opportunities, https://www.ceres.org/investor-network/investor-summit/summit-files/2012-investor-action-plan (last
visited July 21, 2016).
15
Who We Are, Blackrock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-nl/about-us (last visited July 15, 2016).
16
Market Drivers, Blackrock Impact, http://www.blackrockimpact.com/ (last visited July 15, 2016).
17
ClearBridge Investments, The Future of Investing ESG Portfolios: Changing Beliefs, Perceptions and Goals,
Advisor Perspectives (May 12, 2015), http://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2015/05/12/the-future-ofinvesting-esg-portfolios-changing-beliefs-perceptions-and-goals.
18
Id.
19
Angelo Young, Socially Responsible Investing for Millennials: How to Pick Retirement Funds that Match Your
Values, IBTimes (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/socially-responsible-investing-millennials-how-pickretirement-funds-match-your-2133437.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See (Mis)Calculated Risk and Climate Change: Are Rating Agencies Repeating Credit Crisis Mistakes?, Center
for International Environmental Law (May 2015), available at http://www.ciel.org/wp-
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comments advising the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures.23 Friends of the
Earth has developed materials to guide individual investors about SRI pension options, and has
encouraged employers to provide SRI options within 401(k) or 403(b) offerings.24 On June 22,
2015, Greenpeace USA, in an effort to promote sustainable industries, notified the SEC that
Consol Energy may not have adequately disclosed risks, including declining demand for coal, in
the initial public offering (IPO) of CNX Coal Resources, a master limited partnership that would
manage Consol’s thermal coal operations in Pennsylvania.25 It was reported on June 30, 2015
that Consol revised the terms of the IPO and decreased the number of units of CNX Coal
Resources being offered from 8 to 5 million units.26 Sierra Club has provided firms like Harris
Bretall Sullivan & Smith with its proprietary environmental screens to apply to the firm’s
equities.27 Sierra Club has also drawn upon its established social and environmental guidelines to
help in the development of two SRI mutual funds, the Sierra Club Stock Fund and the Sierra
Club Balanced Fund.28
E. ESG data is important for SRI and commenting organizations
The ESG risk factors of investments are material for SRI investors beyond their financial
implications. Indeed, to many SRI investors ESG factors are more important than short-term
financial metrics in both voting and portfolio construction. And while investment returns matter,
the implications of the use of SRI assets to promote a just and sustainable global community
matter as well.
SRI investors’ needs for clear, consistently-presented, comparable ESG data are not
being met by the information being produced by the combination of current mandatory
disclosure under Regulation S-K and companies’ voluntary sustainability reports. A regulatory
mandate from the SEC for the disclosure of ESG data is needed.

content/uploads/2015/10/ciel-rpt-credits-10.15-webv2smaller.pdf. Fixed-income investors also have a need for
better, clearer sustainability information to be available in the market, given that they often have long-term
exposures to credit quality.
23
See CIEL Comments Submitted To FSB Task Force on Climate Related Disclosures, Task Force on Climaterelated Financial Disclosures (Mar. 31, 2016) (on file with author).
24
See Green up your 401K, Friends of the Earth, http://action.foe.org/content.jsp?key=3801 (last visited July 15,
2016).
25
Greenpeace USA, SEC Warned that Consol Coal IPO Overstates Coal Demand with “Incomplete and Misleading
Disclosures, June 22, 2015, available at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/sec-warned-that-consol-coal-ipooverstates-coal-demand-with-incomplete-and-misleading-disclosures/.
26
Anya Litvak, CNX Coal to Start Trading July 1, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette June 30, 2015, available at
http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/companies/2015/06/30/CNX-Coal-to-start-trading-July1/stories/201506300284; Pittsburg Business Times, Consol revises its coal IPO a second time, June 30, 2015,
available at http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/blog/energy/2015/06/consol-revises-its-coal-ipo-a-secondtime.html.
27
William Baue, Sierra Club Launches SRI Mutual Funds, The Conference on Sustainable, Responsible, Impact
Investing (Jan. 15, 2003), http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi?sfArticleId=1006.
28
Id.
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III. Materiality
As acknowledged by the SEC in its Concept Release, the statutory authority of the
Commission with respect to disclosure is broad. Congress, in both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, “authorize[d] the Commission to promulgate rules for registrant disclosure as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”29 Generally the
Commission has used that authority in its disclosure rules “to protect investors, facilitate capital
formation and maintain fair, orderly and efficient capital markets.”30
The concept of “efficient capital markets” includes informational efficiency (market
mechanisms able to process new information quickly and with broad distribution) and allocative
efficiency (distributing capital resources to their highest value use at the lowest cost and risk).
Disclosure is obviously relevant to both efficiency goals, the latter being particularly relevant in
the discussion of requiring better sustainability disclosure. As Mark Carney, Governor of the
Bank of England has put the point with respect to one major sustainability challenge, climate
change, with “consistent, comparable, reliable, and clear disclosure” of firms’ “carbon change
footprint and how they manage their risks and prepare (or not) for a 2 degree world,” both
markets and governments can better manage the transition to a low-carbon future by supporting
the allocation of capital to its risk-adjusted highest-value use in that transition.31
The intellectual workhorse in securities law is the concept of “materiality.” As defined
by the U.S. Supreme Court in TSC v. Northway,32 material information is information that a
“reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding how to vote.”33 As the Court
stated, “[p]ut another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”34 This concept is not self-executing, though.
What is material depends on the perceptions of reasonable investors of what information is
already available in the market, and how any new or omitted information changes those
reasonable investors’ perceptions of the quality of management, when voting, or the value of a
company or its shares, when investing or selling.
In promulgating disclosure regulations under Regulation S-K, the SEC has
predominantly, but not exclusively, sought to require the disclosure of economically material
information (or, more accurately, information it construed as economically material).35 In
contrast to any economic materiality basis for disclosure, though, the SEC has promulgated
corporate governance disclosure regulations, for instance requiring statistics on board members’
attendance at meetings, and the committee structure of the board of directors, with the stated
29

SEC Concept Release, at 22.
Id. at 23.
31
Mark Carney, Governor, Breaking the tragedy of the horizon: climate change and financial stability, Bank of
England 14 (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/844.aspx#.
32
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
33
Id. at 449.
34
Id.
35
See Williams, supra note 3, at 1264- 66.
30
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purpose of encouraging the board to be more active and independent in monitoring
management’s actions with respect to law compliance.36 It has required extensive disclosure of
executive compensation, starting in the early 1990s, as a response to public frustration with the
levels of executive compensation.37 Indeed, with respect to illegal actions by members of
management or the company, the SEC has used a qualitative approach to the definition of
materiality (properly, in our view), establishing an almost per se materiality standard even where
the economic consequences of the illegal actions were trivial.38 So clearly the SEC recognizes it
has the statutory authority to promulgate disclosure requirements beyond those that seem to be
financially material in a short-term sense. The touchstone is the “reasonable investor,” and what
information the reasonable investor is relying upon in voting and investment.
So, would it have been reasonable for investors to have wanted more clearly-comparable
information about BP plc’s safety practices in its U.S. operations, using well-constructed,
industry-standard metrics, prior to the Deepwater Horizons tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico in
2010? Would it have been reasonable for investors to compare that safety data, had it been
available, with other oil majors’ safety records using well-constructed, industry-standard
metrics? There was some information in the market that could have suggested BP was a risky
investment from a safety perspective: information was available in BP’s annual reports about its
continuing efforts to implement the recommendations from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board’s evaluation of BP’s previous tragedy, in 2005 in Texas City, where BP’s
operations had led to an explosion that killed 15 people and injured an additional 180.39 Yet,
without some benchmarks and metrics, it would be difficult for investors to compare BP’s safety
practices with other oil majors. Easily comparable information about companies’ safety records
would have significantly altered the total mix of information available about BP, a company that
was promoting itself as “Beyond Petroleum” and a corporate responsibility leader.40
Not only did BP’s operations lead to an explosion that cost 11 people their lives, tens of
thousands of people their livelihood, massive environmental damage, and over $ 60 billion in
financial losses to the company due to cleanup costs and from liability judgments,41 it also led to
stock prices that underperformed other fossil fuel companies’ share prices by approximately 37%

36

Id., at 1265 & fn. 359.
Id., at 1266 & fn. 363.
38
Id., at 1265 & fn. 361 (citing Division of Corporation Finance’s Views and Comments on Disclosure Relating to
the Making of Illegal Campaign Contributions by Public Companies and/or their Officers and Directors, Securities
Act Release No. 5466, Exchange Act Release No. 10673, 3 SEC Docket 647, 648 (Mar. 19, 1974) (stating SEC’s
view that a conviction of a member of management for making illegal campaign contributions is a material fact to be
disclosed)). See also In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 172 (1964) (Cary, Chair) (stating that the integrity of
management “is always a material factor.”).
39
See U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, BP America Refinery Explosion Investigation Report:
Refinery Explosion and Fire (15 killed, 180 injured) (Mar. 2007), available at: http://www.csb.gov/bp-americarefinery-explosion/.
40
See Raj Thamothram & Maxime Le Floc’h, The BP Crisis as a ‘Preventable Surprise’: Lessons for Institutional
Investors, 5(1) Rotman Int’l J. of Pension Mngmt. 68 (2012), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2064738.
41
Cain Burdeau, BP estimates cost of 2010 Gulf oil spill at $61.6 billion, Washington Post, July 14, 2016, available
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/energy-environment/bp-estimates-cost-of-2010-gulf-oil-spill-at-616billion/2016/07/14/7b045012-4a14-11e6-8dac-0c6e4accc5b1_story.html.
37
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for five years.42 So, socially and environmentally-relevant information, based on standard datacollection and industry disclosure metrics, also would have turned out to be financially-relevant
information.
Or, take another example. Data summarized in an article in a pre-eminent, peer-reviewed
academic management journal, the Academy of Management Review, show slavery and debt
bondage are continuing problems, estimated to affect between 12 to 30 million people worldwide, in agriculture, mining and other extractives industries, construction, brickmaking, fishing
in South-East Asia, carpet weaving, domestic work and other industries.43 Would it be
reasonable for investors today to care about whether the companies they hold in their investment
portfolios have slavery or debt bondage in their supply chains?
We submit that yes, reasonable investors today could care and often do care about these and
many other facts about companies’ responsibilities to the environment and the people affected by
their actions. Many investors care because these types of issues have short-term financial
implications, as did the lack of a process safety culture at BP.44 Other investors care because of
those investors’ moral commitments not to support modes of production that are excessively
harmful or inconsistent with human rights and dignities. Society’s expectations of companies’
social and environmental responsibilities have changed over the four decades since the SEC first
considered requiring better disclosure of environmental and social facts, as has the composition
of the investing public. Today, better sustainability disclosure is required to meet the needs of
today’s reasonable investors.
The SEC need not start from scratch in developing guidance for companies to make
materiality determinations about ESG factors. A number of voluntary organizations are already
working with companies and investors to produce industry-specific disclosure frameworks,
based on the most salient ESG issues in each industry and the contextual sustainability data that
investors seek. These initiatives, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”) or the
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), usefully balance the costs of disclosure
with the utility of the information being produced, while also providing sufficient guidance to
companies about what to disclose. We’ll further discuss in Section VIII how we think the SEC
could build upon these frameworks to develop clear, comparable, efficient ESG disclosure
requirements.

IV. More investors today consider ESG information as material
A. Global Investor coalitions and “mainstream investors” comments

42

See Gordon L. Clark, Andreas Feiner & Michael Viehs, From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How
Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance 14 (March 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508281 (discussing BP as a case study showing the financial
effects of social and environmental risk; stock price under-performance analyzed through March 2015).
43
See Andy Crane, Modern Slavery as a Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and Capabilities for
Human Exploitation, 38(1) Acad. Mngmt. Rev. 49, 51 (2013).
44
See Thamotheram & Le Floc’h, supra note 40 (discussing BP’s lack of a process safety culture).
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Today, investors with $60 trillion of capital are committed to incorporating ESG factors
in their investing and voting decisions as part of the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment
(“PRI”).45 Institutions, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and mutual funds with $95 trillion
of invested capital support the Climate Disclosure Project’s (“CDP”) annual survey of companies
regarding their greenhouse gas emissions and strategies for addressing climate change.46 Global
assets under management utilizing sustainability screens, ESG factors, and corporate
engagement/shareholder action have risen 61% since 2012, to US $21.4 trillion at the start of
2014.47
The statements of leading U.S. investors and executives also emphasize the importance of
having access to better ESG data. BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, has indicated
its recognition of the strategic value of ESG information, and has advocated public policy
changes to mandate the provision of such information with appropriate safe harbors.48 Since
2009, Bloomberg data terminals now incorporate ESG data that Bloomberg sells to securities
dealers, brokers, and investors around the world.49 Even as Bloomberg sells what information it
can confidently assure as accurate, its CEO, Michael Bloomberg, has said that:
[F]or the most part, the sustainability information that is disclosed
by corporations today is not useful for investors or other decision-makers. . .
To help address this issue, I became chair of the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (SASB) in 2014, and last year, I agreed to build on that
work by chairing the new Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures (TCFD). . . .The market cannot accurately value companies, and
investors cannot efficiently allocate capital, without comparable, reliable and
useful data on increasingly relevant climate-related issues . . .50
These are just a few of the indications of growing shareholder interest in sustainability
factors affecting different industries, and the need for better ESG data.51
45

About the PRI, U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment, https://www.unpri.org/about (last visited July 21,
2016).
46
Catalyzing business and government action, Carbon Disclosure Project, https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/AboutUs.aspx (last visited July 21, 2016).
47
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, The Global Sustainable Investment Review 2014 3, 7-8, available at
http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/GSIA_Review_download.pdf.
48
See BlackRock, Viewpoint, Exploring ESG: A Practitioners Perspective (June 2016), available at:
http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-fi/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-exploring-esg-a-practitionersperspective-june-2016.pdf.
49
Bloomberg, Impact Report Update 2015 2, (2015), available at
https://www.bbhub.io/sustainability/sites/6/2016/04/16_0404_Impact_Report.pdf.
50
Id.
51
Other major institutional investors managing successful funds using ESG factors include TIAA-CREF, Parnassus,
Vanguard FTSE, and Eventide Gilead. Nellie S. Huang, 7 Great Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, Kiplinger
(Mar. 2016), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T041-C009-S002-7-great-socially-responsible-mutualfunds.html?page=3. In 2015, Morningstar began including ESG impact scores for all mutual funds and exchangetraded funds, noting that this addition was driven by investor demand and interest in ESG factors. Jeff Benjamin,
Morningstar Shines an ESG light on all mutual funds and ETFs, InvestmentNews (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150814/FREE/150819944/morningstar-shines-an-esg-light-on-allmutual-funds-and-etfs.
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B. Evidence from shareholder resolutions
Over 200 institutional investors and money managers (owning a collective total of at least
$1.7 trillion) filed or co-filed shareholder resolutions on ESG issues between 2012 and 2014.52
Climate change has become a particularly salient topic for shareholder resolutions; from 2001 to
2015 there has been an increase in North American shareholder resolutions related to climate
change disclosure, from less than 10 to 167.53
Of particular note, ESG disclosure resolutions broke records in 2015 and 2016, the
majority of which were regarding political spending and climate change issues.54 In 2015, BP
shareholders voted 98% in favor of a resolution committing BP to provide information on
climate change resilience.55 Shell shareholders have similarly voted 99% in favor of a disclosure
resolution on climate resilience.56 These percentages ensure that the shareholder proposals are
legally binding on BP and Shell management.57 Shareholders at ExxonMobil’s and Chevron’s
annual meetings in 2016 also registered strong support for climate disclosure resolutions. Exxon
shareholders voted 38% in favor of a proposal to publish a report on the impacts of climate
change policies.58 Chevron shareholders voted 41% in favor of a similar proposal to publish
long-term impacts of possible climate change policies.59 These votes showed more shareholder
support for climate-related proposals at Exxon and Chevron than in any previous shareholder
meeting.60 Collectively these voting results show that the shareholders of companies particularly
vulnerable to pressures on their business model from climate change want to know more than
companies are currently disclosing about what management is doing to position the company in
the future.

52

SRI Basics, supra note 7.
Investor Network on Climate Risk, Shareholders Spur Action on Climate Change: Company Commitments from
2014 & 2015 Proxy Seasons 3, 4 (Ceres) (2015), available at http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/shareholdersspur-action-on-climate-change-company-commitments-from-the-2014-2015-proxy-seasons.
54
Press Release, Record Number of Climate and Corporate Political Spending Resolutions Dominate 2016
Shareholder Votes, Proxy Preview (Mar. 8, 2016), available at http://www.proxypreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/proxy_preview_release_record_number_climate_corporate_political_spending_resolutions
_dominate_2016_shareholder_votes_20160308.pdf (providing data on 2016 shareholder resolutions); Press Release,
Record Number of Social and Environmental Shareholder Resolutions Filed in 2015, Proxy Preview (Mar. 5, 2015),
available at http://www.proxypreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/release-record-number-of-social-andenvironmental-shareholder-resolutions-filed-in-2015.pdf (providing data on 2015 shareholder resolutions).
55
Terry Macalister, BP Promises more Transparency on Climate Change issues, The Guardian, Apr. 16, 2015,
available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/16/bp-promises-more-transparency-on-climate-issues.
56
ClientEarth, Shell follows BP with climate change resolution (May 19, 2015), http://www.clientearth.org/shellfollows-bp-with-climate-change-resolution/.
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58
Exxon, Notice of Annual 2016 Proxy Meeting and Proxy Statement 69, (2016) (listing details of proxy item 12);
Exxon, Summary of 2016 Proxy Voting Results (2016) (listing voting results of proxy item 12).
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Chevron, 2016 Proxy Statement 70 (2016) (listing details of proxy item 7); Chevron Corporation, U.S. S.E.C.
Form 8-K (Proxy Item 7) (2016) (listing voting results of all proxy statements).
60
Bradley Olson & Nicole Friedman, Exxon, Chevron Shareholders Narrowly Reject Climate-Change Stress Tests,
The Wall St. Journal, May 25, 2016, available at, http://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-chevron-shareholdersnarrowly-reject-climate-change-stress-tests-1464206192.
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V. The materiality of sustainability information
One reason that more investors today are seeking better ESG disclosure is because in
today’s world sustainability factors present economically material risks, and possibly
opportunities, for companies in almost every industry and every part of the world. There are
many reasons for this development, a number of which we discuss here: (A) Companies
managing ESG factors well can outperform other companies; (B)(1) the physical and regulatory
changes associated with climate change present material financial risks in almost every industry
and throughout the world; (2) the resource pressures on global ecosystems present material
financial risks in many industries; and (3) changing environmental and social justice norms are
creating acute pressures on companies in many industries. The ability of NGOs to communicate
about companies’ actions throughout the world and the increasingly interdependent global
supply chains for products across a range of industries exacerbate these material financial risks.
A. Managing ESG Matters Well Can Produce Positive Financial Outcomes
While discussions of sustainability and ESG disclosure often frame the issues for
investors in terms of risks and potential costs of inattention to sustainability issues, as measuring
techniques improve and mediating variables are identified, certain results are emerging that
substantiate the early (2003) meta-analytic result of Marc Orlitzky, Frank Schmidt, and Sara
Rynes that sustainability investments (which they construe under the rubric of “corporate social
responsibility”) can pay off.61 In a comparative paper evaluating attention to sustainability
across countries, Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog show that better sustainability performance also
increases firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q.62 This finding is consistent with the results of
Bob Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, and George Serafeim, who demonstrate that companies with a
strategic focus on ESG issues show financial outperformance, and stock market and accounting
value premiums, based on eighteen years’ worth of observations of 90 matched pairs of highsustainability versus low-sustainability companies.63 More recent work by Serafeim and
colleagues Mozaffar Khan and Aaron Yoon show that management attention to a range of
sustainability risks yields financial outperformance of 3% to 8%, evaluated within industries
using specific concepts of industry-relevant materiality being developed in the United States by
the SASB.64
A comprehensive review in 2014 of empirical studies of the financial results of corporate
responsibility by Gordon Clark, Andreas Feiner and Michael Viehs found that 90% of studies
61

This study is a widely-cited (over 3,300 citations to 2015) meta-analysis of 52 prior studies, and it shows better
financial performance of firms with better environmental and social records, although the magnitudes of the
financial correlations, while statistically significant, are modest. See Marc Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt, & Sara L.
Rynes, Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 24 Org. Stud. 403 (2003).
62
See Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, Finance and Society: On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility,
Tilburg Univ. CentER for Econ. Research, European Corporate Governance Inst. (ECGI) Finance Working Paper
No. 394/2013 (Jan. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360633.
63
See Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou, & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on
Organizational Processes and Performance, 60:11 Mngmt. Science 2835 (2014).
64
See Mozaffar Khan, George Serafeim, & Aaron Yoon, Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality,
Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper 15-073 (Mar. 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2575912.
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show that sound sustainability standards lower firms’ cost of capital; 80% of studies show that
the stock price performance of companies is positively influenced by good sustainability
practices; and 88% of studies show that better E, S, or G practices result in better operational
performance.65 The answers are thus becoming clearer on the empirical questions related to the
positive financial effects of attention to sustainability issues.
There are a number of implications that could be drawn from these studies for the
question of mandatory ESG disclosure. First, voluntary disclosure efforts can be expected to
produce some ESG data, since it is in firms’ interests to publicize their positive results. Second,
though, since most ESG disclosure is voluntary, firms may not provide a balanced view, and may
not discuss the bad with the good. Third, and most relevant for these purposes, these results
show the financial (quantitative) materiality of some types of sustainability practices.
Disclosure regimes well-designed to capture these data are of potential value to both SRI
and non-SRI investors. To the extent that SRI investors’ concerns are broader than those of nonSRI investors, or take account of trends with a longer time-frame to eventuate, disclosure
frameworks to be discussed in Part VIII below can accommodate both types of investors without
recourse to the disclosure of clearly insignificant information or formulaic, uninformative,
boiler-plate.
B. Managing ESG Matters Badly Can Produce Negative Financial Outcomes
1. Climate change risk
a. Five types of risk
Climate change has arguably created the most encompassing range of risks facing
companies, their investors, and citizens and communities generally. There are five types of risks
that arise from the meteorological and geophysical events, economic and social trends, and
future uncertainties that can be attributed to climate change. Each of these risks present
differential implications depending on the industry and location of a company’s operational
facilities throughout the world.
Regulatory Risks
The agreement concluded during the 21st Conference of the Parties of the United
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“COP21”) in Paris in December, 2015,
demonstrates a global consensus to address the risks associated with climate change.66 The
65

See Gordon L. Clark, Andreas Feiner & Michael Viehs, From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How
Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance (2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508281. We submit that this report is an excellent resource for
the SEC to consult because it analyzes the empirical literature on the financial effects of sustainability initiatives by
type of initiative (E, S, or G) and by various financial measures of interest (cost of debt capital; cost of equity
capital; operating performance; and effect on stock prices). The study also identifies scientifically sound metaanalyses and literature reviews.
66
See The Paris Agreement, U.N.F.C.C.C., http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php (last visited July 15,
2015).
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underlying goal of the Paris Agreement -- to limit the warming of the Earth to “well under” 2º
Celsius67 , and “pursuing efforts” to limit to 1.5° Celsius68 -- will have a significant effect on
companies that operate in the countries that ratify the Agreement and implement their “nationally
determined contributions” (“NDCs”).69
In the wake of the Paris Agreement, businesses that operate in carbon-intensive industries
(such as fossil fuels, coal, non-renewable energy production, transportation, cement, and
agriculture, for instance) will face risks to their business models posed by regulation aimed at
encouraging the necessary transition to a low-carbon economy. Most notably, the International
Energy Agency (“IEA”) estimates that no more than one-third of current global fossil fuel
reserves can be burned before reaching that temperature target.70 Thus, as countries take action
to meet this collective target, two-thirds of the world’s fossil fuel reserves are at risk of
becoming “stranded assets,” jeopardizing an estimate $6 trillion of dollars of shareholder value.71
SASB is in the process of developing sustainability accounting standards with the
collaboration of industry and investors in the U.S., and has found that 72 of 79 industries it
evaluated face financial pressures from climate change and regulatory efforts to address it,
although the implications are different for different industries.72 In the wake of the Paris
Agreement, it is likely that businesses that operate in carbon-intensive industries (such as fossil
fuels, coal, non-renewable energy production, transportation, cement, and agriculture) will face
risks to their business models posed by regulation aimed at encouraging the necessary transition
to a low-carbon economy. Similarly, the credit rating agency Moody’s has recently announced
that it will analyze carbon transition risks when analyzing companies’ credit worthiness, taking
into account all commitments made during last year’s Paris Agreement.73
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Haydn Watters, 5 key points in Paris Agreement on climate change, CBC News (Dec. 12, 2015),
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Physical Risks
These are risks to businesses posed by physical changes that have already occurred, or
are likely to occur, based on scientific predictions and current trends. Drought, rising sea levels,
increasing acidification of the oceans, and an increase in storm intensity are all examples of ways
that climate change has already affected our environment.74 These events have had profound
impacts on many businesses, from supply chain disruptions to higher production costs.75
Insurance companies, for instance, have already been affected by the increasing number of
billion-dollar storms in the last decade.76
Competitive risks
An increase in carbon emissions regulation, coupled with a global demand for sustainable
business products, has resulted in increased competition for the sale of environmentally friendly
products, presenting opportunities for some businesses.77 Alternatively, these regulations have
increased the costs of manufacturing or extracting carbon-intensive products while
simultaneously lowering demand for those products.78 Changing environments contribute to a
shift in demand and thus, an increase or decrease in competitive advantage.
Legal Risks
A number of developments are creating increased legal risk for recalcitrant companies.
Some corporations and their directors may face tort and fiduciary duty liability if they do not
seriously consider and address the potential legal risks of continued contributions to climate
change. ExxonMobil is under investigation by a number of state attorneys general, including
those of California, New York and Massachusetts, and by the attorney general of the District of
Columbia, for potential material misstatements or omissions in their communications to the
public and investors about the threat of climate change.79 By publicly expressing deep
skepticism about the reality of climate change and challenging the reliability of scientists’
74

Jim Coburn & Jackie Cook, Cool Response: The SEC and Corporate Climate Change Reporting 8 (Ceres) (2014),
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http://www.share.ca/files/SHARE_ClimateChangeandBankPaperFINAL_1.pdf.
78
The drop in demand for coal is the clearest example of this trend to date. Earlier this year the largest publiclytraded company in the world, Peabody Energy, filed for bankruptcy. See Tiffany Kary, Tim Loh & Jim Polson,
Coal Slump Sends Mining Giant Peabody Energy Into Bankruptcy, Bloomberg (Apr. 13, 2016), available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-13/peabody-majority-of-its-u-s-entities-file-for-chapter-11.
79
See John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Climate Change Inquiry in New York Gains Allies, N.Y. Times (Mar. 29, 2016),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/new-york-climate-change-inquiry-into-exxon-addsprosecutors.html?_r=0.

15

climate models while using those same models in its long-term infrastructure planning, Exxon
Mobil may have opened itself to not only public regulatory suits, but shareholder litigation80 as
well.81 Such suits would be similar in nature to the cases brought against tobacco companies for
misrepresenting the adverse health impacts of cigarette smoking, which ultimately resulted in
settlements of almost $250 billion.82
Companies are at heightened risk of both climate change litigation and liability risk today
around the world. Major oil, gas, and coal companies, some of which are listed and regulated in
the U.S., are currently under investigation by the Commission on Human Rights of the
Philippines for current and threatened human rights violations resulting from climate change.83
There is a discernible tendency for courts to accept and to act on IPCC climate science in holding
that governments and corporations owe a duty of care to present and future generations.84 New
multi-billion dollar investment projects such as drilling for oil and gas in Arctic waters may thus
face the risk that licenses awarded by a country’s government will be declared constitutionally
invalid by that country’s courts.85
Reputational Risks
Companies that continue to contribute unapologetically to climate change today without a
clear, public plan to mitigate emissions and transition to a low-carbon economy are at risk of
reputational damage. BP and Royal Dutch Shell are the most obvious examples of companies
that have already suffered serious reputational damage due to environmental catastrophes and
deeply-problematic community relationships, evidenced by the fallout from the Deepwater
Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico (BP), and decades-long litigation against Royal Dutch
Shell plc and/or Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria concerning serious
allegations, such as human rights abuses and environmental pollution in the Niger Delta.86
Today, Exxon Mobil is litigating on multiple fronts with the potential for serious reputational
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consequences in addition to the financial consequences of litigation costs and potential liability
judgments.
b. These risks are significant to shareholders
Investors currently do not have access to clear, comparable information on how
companies intend to manage many of these climate-change risks. The U.S. insurance industry
provides a good example. Climate change is understood to be contributing to an increase in
extreme weather events around the world, such as heat waves, droughts and wildfires. In the
U.S., droughts in the Midwest and on the Mississippi River in 2012 resulted in close to $18
billion in insured losses,87 while Hurricane Sandy caused nearly $29 billion in insured losses.88
In 2013, in response to these extreme weather events, regulators in five key states required
climate change risk disclosure from all insurers with an excess of $100 million in written
premiums. This requirement affected 87 per cent of the American insurance market.89 Yet, a
study published in October, 2014, by Ceres found that only 38 of the 330 companies affected by
this regulatory requirement had issued public climate change risk management statements,
despite these insurers being on “the front lines of climate change risk.”90
This lack of in-depth insight into managements’ strategies for managing climate change
risks is also of concern in the fossil fuel industry. As a result, in 2013, 70 institutional investors
managing upwards of $3 trillion launched an on-going effort called the Carbon Asset Risk
(“CAR”) project, calling on the world’s top 45 non-renewable energy companies to assess the
risks of climate change to their businesses.91 The risk assessment sought information on how
“current and probable future policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent by
2050” would affect company reserves of fossil fuels that may never be burned, but are valued as
assets in the companies’ financial statements.92 To date, responses to the CAR project have been
insufficient: episodic and incomplete. The concern about unburnable carbon is even more acute
after the commitment made at COP21 to keep global warming to under 2º Celsius, as the
International Energy Agency (“IEA”) estimates that no more than one-third of current global
fossil fuel reserves can be burned before reaching that temperature increase.93 As policies are
implemented around the world to reflect that estimate, these reserves are increasingly at risk of
becoming “stranded assets.”94
87
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c. Disclosure as a regulatory tool to address these risks
Each of these categories of risk was discussed by Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank
of England, and Chairman of the G20’s Financial Stability Board (“FSB”), in a speech in
September, 2015, to members of Lloyds of London. Gov. Carney entitles the risks from climate
change a “tragedy of the horizon” since the most serious consequences of today’s emissions will
eventuate beyond the time-frame of today’s business cycles, political cycles and regulatory
cycles, which are at maximum ten years.95
Governor Carney recognized global risks from climate change to property, political
stability, food supplies and water security. He then concentrated on three categories of financial
risks discussed above: those caused by the physical changes induced by climate change; liability
risks if “extractors and emitters” and/or their officers and directors were to be held liable for the
negative effects of their products; and financial risks from the transition to a low-carbon
economy.96 This latter category includes the risk of the value of “stranded [oil, gas and coal]
assets” on the balance sheets of banks, insurance companies and pension funds rapidly losing
value; and the potential that “an abrupt resolution of the tragedy of the horizons is itself a
financial stability risk.”97
Governor Carney then suggested that a solution to this “tragedy of the horizons” would be
better information to help “the market itself to adjust efficiently,” in a situation where multiple
parameters will “affect the speed of transition to a low-carbon economy,” including public
policy, technology, investor preferences and physical events.98 One approach Gov. Carney
discussed then was for the FSB is to ask the G20 “to establish an industry-led group, a Climate
Disclosure Task Force, to design and deliver a voluntary standard for disclosure by those
companies that produce or emit carbon.”99 (That task force has since been established, and its
first round of consultations concluded.100) By having access to information about the carbon
intensity of goods and services investors can then “assess risks to companies’ business models
and to express their views in the market.”101 This information can also inform policy makers as
well, who could “learn from markets’ reactions and refine their stance, with better information
allowing more informed reactions, and supporting better policy decisions including on targets
and instruments.”102
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Governor Carney recognized that information on carbon emissions is not lacking in the
market: indeed, he stated that there are “nearly 400 initiatives”103 that suggest or require the
disclosure of companies’ greenhouse gas emissions or environmental data. Still, with more
consistent, comparable, reliable, clear and efficient information about companies’ current
emissions and the strategies companies plan to employ in their transition to the “net-zero world
of the future,” he asserted that both markets and governments would have better tools to manage
the transition to a low-carbon economy. Generally Gov. Carney has faith that by “managing
what gets measured, we can break the Tragedy of the Horizon.”104
As we’ll discuss below, voluntary initiatives such as that now underway in the FSB’s
Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures are useful in establishing benchmarks for
proactive corporate action to address the encompassing risks of climate change, as are broader
sustainability reporting initiatives. Voluntary initiatives are insufficient, however, to provide
investors with the comprehensive, comparable, and consistently-presented information that could
enable the markets to perform in the way Governor Carney suggests they can: to allocate capital
efficiently towards companies that are effective in pioneering the necessary transition to a lowcarbon economy. An SEC mandate is therefore necessary to address the “tragedy of the
horizons,” acting perhaps in concert with other securities regulators through IOSCO, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions.
2. Resource constraints generally
Statistics show that the world is using natural resources at a rate that exceeds the earth’s
annual carrying capacity.105 In order to sustain our current use of natural resources, it is
estimated we would need 1.6 Earths.106 This overuse of our resources places obvious constraints
on future resource use, across industries and geographic regions, from the increased costs of food
leading to food insecurity, to changing business models to absorb the market uncertainties.107
Resource constraints affect industries across the board.108 In a 2013 survey, McKinsey
and Company lists resource constraints as one of the factors that are reshaping the global
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economy.109 These constraints lead to price shocks, price volatility and increased prices, which
in turn increase the costs and risks for manufacturers.110 The agriculture and food industries
illustrate how resource scarcity paired with a linkage to the energy industry creates production
and price issues.
The food and agriculture industries are significantly affected by the depletion of natural
resources because of their resource-intensive111 nature and the emerging and potentially
competing biomass market.112 Not only do resource restraints contribute to high and volatile
food prices, they also limit the capacity to increase global food production as the world’s
population increases.113 Experts suggest that a smooth transition to new forms of food
production to adapt to a resource-constrained world will require technological innovation, paired
with regional management of resources, more sustainable use of resources, and increased longterm investment distributed to smallholder farmers.114 In the interim, companies from energy,
agriculture, food, distribution, packaging, and chemicals (for fertilizers and pesticides) will be
affected by the uncertainties of managing this transition.
3. Changing environmental and social justice norms are creating acute pressures
on many industries
Many industry sectors that pose serious environmental challenges also create significant
social and political risks that affect companies’ on-going production and social license to
operate. 115 Such social risks are acute in, but are not limited to, such industries as agriculture,
including forest and land conversion; energy infrastructure such as dams, power plants, refineries
and incinerators; transport infrastructure including ports, roads, and terminals; and mining of
minerals.116
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Underlying all of these sectors, largely but not exclusively in developing economies, is
land rights or land tenure risk.117 As demand for minerals, energy, timber, and agricultural
products has grown it has stimulated widespread acquisitions of land by private companies for
natural resource investments.118 While such investments can provide positive development
benefits, they can also cause harmful development impacts, which at different points may require
conflict management, remediation, compensation, or other forms of intervention, all of which
have material costs and consequences.
Not infrequently, material harm is caused to companies in response to material harm
caused to local communities119 by companies or their government counterparts; when land
occupied by communities is allocated to an investment project, conflicts over land tenure120 and
related issues frequently emerge. Land tenure conflicts with attendant “land tenure risks” are
particularly prevalent and costly in the agriculture, forestry, infrastructure, and mining sectors,
due to the land-dependent nature of those sectors.121 US-domiciled companies are prominent
investors in land in all sectors.122
Land tenure risk to projects can stem from local communities’ opposition, resulting in
losses from delayed operations or even forced withdrawal, as well as reputational damage,123 and
loss of the “social license to operate”. Tenure-related disputes can greatly increase financial
risks for companies in land-dependent sectors,124 making this issue highly relevant to informed
voting and investment decisions. In many documented examples, tenure-related disputes have
caused delays, significantly increased project costs, and even imperiled the solvency of the
investor companies encountering such conflicts.125
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VI. The existence of many voluntary sustainability disclosure initiatives does
not preclude the need for SEC action
A. The voluntary disclosure landscape
Over the past two decades, corporate sustainability reporting has developed from an
academic idea in critical accounting to a global business practice.126 While some jurisdictions
are starting to require ESG reporting, much of this reporting is still voluntary.
The most comprehensive source of data on ESG reporting is that done by KPMG in the
Netherlands. KPMG published its first ESG report in 1993, and its most recent in 2013. In
1993, 12% of the top 100 companies in the OECD countries (ex. Japan) published an
environmental or social report.127 By 2013, 76% of the top 100 companies in the Americas
publish a separate corporate responsibility report, as do 73% of top 100 companies in Europe and
71% in Asia.128 Of the largest 250 companies globally, reporting rates are 93%.129
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s voluntary, multi-stakeholder framework for ESG
reporting has emerged as the clear global benchmark: 78% of reporting companies worldwide
and 82% of the Global 250 use GRI as the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting.130
Slightly over half (59%) of the Global 250 now have their reports “assured,” most often (twothirds of the time) by the specialist bureaus of the major accountancy firms.131
In addition to the quantity of corporate responsibility reporting, KPMG also evaluates the
quality of reporting. Here, European companies generally do substantially better than those in
Asia or the Americas (average quality scores of 71 out of 100 in Europe versus 54 for companies
in the Americas and 50 in Asia Pacific).132 Within the Global 250, companies are starting to see
more opportunities than risks from social and environmental factors, such as for the development
of new products and services. Eighty-seven percent of the Global 250 identifies climate change,
material resource scarcity and trends in energy and fuel as “megatrends” that will affect their
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business.133 Ultimately KPMG concludes that “[m]any companies no longer see corporate
responsibility as a moral issue, but as core business risks and opportunities.”134
B. Problems with comparability
Given GRI’s diffusion throughout the global 250 for use as the framework for
sustainability reporting, it will be used to demonstrate the problems associated with voluntary
disclosure initiatives generally. GRI is a pioneer in expanded ESG disclosure, and as such has
played an important role in working with companies to legitimize the idea that companies should
routinely disclose more information about their social and environmental effects to stakeholders
and investors. The problems being discussed below are endemic to voluntary disclosure
initiatives, we argue, and ought not to be interpreted as a unique criticism of GRI.
Some context about GRI is in order. The goal of GRI is to provide a standard, highquality framework for organizations to use and adapt for purposes of their “triple bottom line”
reporting, which is reporting on their most “critical impacts—positive or negative—on the
environment, society and the economy.”135 The framework includes two parts: “general standard
disclosures” for all organizations, and “specific standard disclosures” based on the industry and
social and environmental risks and opportunities in that particular industry. The general standard
disclosures comprise seven categories, those being “strategy and analysis; organizational profile;
identified material aspects and boundaries; stakeholder engagement; report profile; governance;
and ethics and integrity.”136 The specific standard disclosures include Disclosure on
Management’s Approach (DMA) to identifying and managing its material Aspects; and then
ninety-one potential indicators describing various social, economic and environmental material
Aspects that might be affected by a company’s operations.
Sector specific frameworks are being developed to identify specific standard disclosures
for airport operators; construction and real estate; electric utilities; event organizers; financial
services; food processing; media; mining and metals; NGOs; and oil and gas. In the new to latest
iteration of the G4, organizations are asked to identify the boundaries they are using in defining
the scope of reporting, recognizing that the boundaries of an organization’s effects can be both
within its organization and outside of its organization, such as in its supply chain or in the
communities where it operates.137
Comparability of information has been an articulated goal for GRI’s triple bottom line
disclosure, just as it is for financial disclosure, yet GRI’s framework, since it is voluntary, allows
for quite non-comparable reports among organizations. Companies and other organizations can
chose to report in accordance with GRI’s G4 framework based on one of two options, just as
they’ve been able to choose their approach to reporting in prior versions of GRI. “Core”
133
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reporting requires a generic DMA (Disclosure of Management’s Approach) and use of at least
one indicator for each material Aspect of an organization’s operations; while “comprehensive”
reporting requires a generic DMA and use of all indicators that GRI has identified for each
material Aspect.138 While organizations are encouraged to report on indicators that give a
comprehensive and balanced view of material Aspects, there is no enforcement mechanism yet to
advance that normative suggestion. As a result, even where companies are in the same sector,
their reports cannot easily be compared.
One study comparing GRI reports in the automotive industry sought to evaluate whether the
information being produced by GRI reporters can be used in the way GRI suggests—to affect
organizations’ decisions, to promote sustainability and to empower outside stakeholders—and
concluded as follows:
In sum, our brief analysis of actual GRI reports suggests that even though
all [automotive] companies claim full coverage of the GHG indicators, the information they
provide is of limited practical use. A look at other indicators confirms this finding. . .
Thus, quantitative data are not always gathered systematically and reported
completely, while qualitative information appears unbalanced and often fails to
include a credible assessment of the sustainability impacts of various measures
taken by a reporting organization. These findings are consistent with a GRI
study on human rights reporting, according to which only 7 percent of all reports
examined complied with the information requirements of quantitative human rights
indicators.139
Other academic studies have observed similar problems with the comparability of the
information being reported.140
C. Problems with completeness
Another serious problem with voluntary sustainability reporting is a lack of
completeness: often central issues to a particular industry or company are not discussed, or are
discussed in cursory terms that give investors no clear insights into how the company is
managing the issue or positioning itself for the future. This problem was studied by Markus
Milne, Amanda Ball and Rob Gray, the latter a pioneer in social accounting, in surveying the
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existing literature on GRI as a preeminent example of triple bottom line reporting.141 As
summarized in their research from 2012-13:
The quality—and, especially, the completeness—of many triple bottom line reports
are not high. Despite increased awareness, recent reporting remains little better than that
of the early European pioneers in the early 1990s. And with a few notable exceptions,
the reports cover few stakeholders, cherry pick elements of news and generally ignore the
major social issues that arise from corporate activity such as lobbying, advertising,
increased consumption, distributions of wealth and so on. The reports often refer to
“sustainability” and “sustainable development,” but virtually unaddressed are issues of
equity and social justice, and completely unaddressed are issues of the scale of
development, limits and constraints to that development, and future generations: issues
we identified in the previous section [of this Article] as core to sustainability concerns.142
Milne, Ball and Gray concluded that “current efforts of environmental or sustainability
reporting are woefully inadequate . . . .”143
A 2012 report by SRI pioneer Steve Lydenberg, written for the Hauser Institute at Harvard’s
Kennedy School and the Initiative for Responsible Investment concurred:
As part of an effort to regain [societal] trust, corporations are increasingly issuing
sustainability reports, but are often accused of “greenwashing” when these reports do not
address the issues of greatest sustainability importance to their industry. Natural gas
companies do not address the implications of their controversial hydraulic fracturing
practices. Food product companies do not confront the obesity epidemic and the role
their products may be playing in it. Utility companies do not confront the long-term
environmental implications of dependence on coal as a primary fuel.144
But it is not only academic studies of voluntary sustainability disclosure that have identified
these problems of a lack of comparability and completeness with such disclosure. In a recent
report, BlackRock, as stated above the world’s largest asset manager, stated that:
Environmental, social, and governance issues are integral to our investment
stewardship activities, as the majority of our clients are saving for long-term goals. It is
over the long-term that ESG factors – ranging from climate change to diversity to board
effectiveness – have real and quantifiable financial impacts. Our risk analysis extends
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across all sectors and geographies, helping us identify companies lagging behind peers on
ESG issues.145
And yet current reporting practices are insufficient for the kinds of in-depth investment
analysis that BlackRock seeks with its ESG integration:
Companies face a distinct challenge in that different issues will be important to
different stakeholders. In our experience, current corporate sustainability reporting often
includes disclosure about factors that, while honorable, are less relevant to investment
decision making (e.g., corporate philanthropy). As a result, current reporting practices
may make it difficult to identify investment decision-useful data (e.g., water usage and
risks in . . . [a] beverage company . . . .146
Generally, BlackRock identifies three problems with current voluntary initiatives, which
views are worth quoting at length:
“(1) Reliance on self-reported data to questionnaires and industry bodies
Company disclosed information is sparse and disparate across industries and regions. The
reliance on self-reported data to private aggregators allows companies to disclose
favorable data or opt out completely. Furthermore, there is no accountability or
overarching governing body ensuring accuracy of reported information.
(2) Inconsistent collection, management, and distribution of ESG data
ESG data is collected, managed, and dispersed by multiple data providers and is not
easily accessible to all investors in a standard form. This creates a challenge for
investment professionals attempting to systematically compare companies across
industries and regions, either in real time or over historical time periods.
(3) Disparate approaches to measure and report ESG information to investors
Due to different methodologies and disclosures, index providers and asset managers
report ESG considerations inconsistently, creating challenges for investors seeking to
compare ESG investment strategies, objectives and outcomes consistently.”147

VII. Design principles for mandatory sustainability disclosure
Given the above problems, there is ample reason for the SEC to promulgate mandatory
sustainability disclosure regulations, so that ESG disclosure and data would be clearer, more
comparable, more complete, and more consistently presented. Academic insights into important
aspects of policy design for such disclosure is found in Archon Fung, Mary Graham and David
Weil’s work as part of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Transparency Policy Project analyzing the
145
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use of “targeted transparency” as a regulatory mechanism.148 They find disclosure is an effective
approach to regulation when used to “compel companies to disclose information in standardized
formats to reduce specific risks, to ameliorate externalities arising from a failure of consumers or
producers to consider social costs associated with a product, or to improve provision of public
goods and services.”149
The five elements of properly-targeted transparency initiatives the authors identified are:
A. Clearly-stated purposes
As the FSB defined the purpose of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial
Disclosures, now led by Michael Bloomberg, it is to reduce fragmentation of global climate
change risk reporting schemes by creating “consistent, comparable, reliable, clear and efficient
climate change-related disclosures.”150 The Task Force is using a voluntary approach for its
recommendations, however, presumably because of the jurisdictional limits of the regulators
involved.151 A similar, and similarly necessary purpose, could well inform the SEC’s
promulgation of required sustainability disclosure—presumably relying upon a number of the
voluntary initiatives that already have been developed with industry support, such as GRI,
SASB, the FSB taskforce, and so forth. Additionally, the Mandatory Corporate Ecological
Impact Disclosure: A Working Paper by Foundation Earth suggests specific ways to ensure
consistent disclosure (including on the effects of companies’ supply chains) and auditable
standards to be used by independent ecological auditors.152
B. Specified Targets for Disclosers
Fung et al. argue that targeted transparency regimes must clearly specify which entities
and organizations “are viewed as responsible for some public risk or performance problem.”153
This design parameter supports the development of industry-specific data and disclosure
requirements, as both GRI and SASB have done. For instance, it is widely scientifically
accepted that GHG emissions absorb heat in the atmosphere, and an increase in gasses like
carbon dioxide and methane have contributed to, and are contributing to, an increase in the
world’s temperature over time.154 Thus, industry-specific sustainability disclosure requirements
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addressing climate risks should apply to companies that are responsible for producing carbonintensive products and/or emitting large amounts of GHG into the atmosphere.
According to research published by Richard Heede of the Climate Accountability
Institute, 12.5% of all carbon pollution from 1854-2010 was emitted by the five companies now
known as Chevron, Conoco Phillips, BP, Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell.155 More than
60% of carbon and methane emissions in that same time frame were produced by just 90 entities
around the world, all of which operate in fossil fuels or cement production.156 While these would
presumably not be the only industry participants required to disclose their GHG emissions,
particular regulatory (and enforcement) attention could be applied first to these industries.
C. Defined Scope of Information
Fung et al. explain that the information mandated by disclosure obligations must clearly
state what information is to be released, and moreover, that information must relate directly to
the information asymmetry the policy seeks to remedy.157 If it is information the company
already collects, it must now disclose it to the public. If it is new information that is required,
companies must create mechanisms that allow them to capture that information and disseminate
it to the public.158
While the SEC will clearly be concerned that the benefits of any new disclosure
obligations outweigh the costs, it should be noted that there are benefits to companies as well as
costs from better sustainability practices, as might be motivated by expanded ESG disclosure.
Evidence presented above (see page 13, supra) included discussion of a comprehensive review in
2014 of empirical studies of the financial results of corporate responsibility by Oxford University
Professor Gordon Clark, Andreas Feiner and Michael Viehs, which found that 90% of studies
show that sound sustainability standards lower firms’ cost of capital; 80% of studies show that
the stock price performance of companies is positively influenced by good sustainability
practices; and 88% of studies show that better E, S, or G practices result in better operational
performance.159
D. Standardized content
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Fragmentation of ESG disclosure has led to a wealth of information that lacks investor
utility on a global scale. Standardization of measuring and reporting information within and
across industries is key “in order to make the information comparable from product to product
and institution to institution.”160 In many industries, such standardization is in development
within voluntary initiatives, or even in some cases global protocols are in development. One
example of the latter is with respect to GHG emissions, where standardization is being achieved:
at the 2014 COP20 conference in Peru countries were able to establish, after a decade of work, a
globally-endorsed standard to measure GHG emissions.161 The development of common,
reliable, consistent and verifiable standards for data disclosure generally would help eliminate
issues regarding comparability of different measurement standards, for the benefit of both
investors and policy-makers. Many voluntary initiatives have produced models to evaluate in
this regard, as discussed below.
What must be avoided is the approach taken to toxic pollution reporting in the United
States, where Fung et al. found that the structure of regulation allows companies to use “a variety
of estimating techniques to determine pollution quantities, [and where] changes in estimating
techniques sometimes led to sudden drops in reported pollution levels that were not necessarily
associated with true reductions.”162 This lack of standard metrics to use, and weak oversight, has
resulted in incomplete and misleading disclosure, which is arguably no better than a complete
lack of disclosure.163
E. Enforcement
The final point is arguably the most important element of targeted transparency: there
must be the enforcement of penalties for egregious misrepresentations or omissions in order for
transparency to be effective as a regulatory mechanism. Without costs associated with
misreporting and non-reporting, corporations can operate with relative impunity. As BlackRock
noted regarding voluntary sustainability disclosure “there is no accountability or overarching
governing body ensuring accuracy of reported information.”164

VIII. Ideas for useful formats and/or procedures
Assuming that the SEC will be requiring companies to produce and disclose more ESG
and sustainability data, we provide here some preliminary thoughts on design principles. A
number of concepts are important here.
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First, a number of organizations have been producing disclosure frameworks that the
SEC should evaluate as potentially useful starting points, in part or in whole. The value of many
of these frameworks, such as the GRI; the Carbon Disclosure Project’s CDSB (Carbon
Disclosure Standards Board); or the SASB, to name just a few, is that they’ve been developed
with the participation of investors, industry and NGOs. On evaluation, the SEC may conclude
that one or more of these frameworks provide a good indication of investors’ interests, as well as
industries’ capacities to produce the information being sought. In its recent report “Exploring
ESG,” BlackRock identified and described what it termed “select major ESG Standards
initiatives.”165 These included the three just mentioned, as well as six others: Ceres; the FSB’s
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures; the Global Impact Investing Rating System
(GIIRS); International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), described below; the U.N.
Principles of Responsible Investment; and Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSE). Each has a
different focus and approach, as well as “maturity,” so all would presumably be worth evaluating
for strengths and weaknesses for an ESG disclosure framework.
Second, one design feature that seems particularly apt is that of industry-specific
disclosure frameworks, or industry-specific key performance indicators (KPIs) or data points.
Some indicators (such as labor indicators or energy consumed) may span all industries, but an
indicator for the amount of water used per million dollars of revenue would not—yet would be a
highly useful indicator for evaluating the risks of investments in beverage companies or
agriculture, among others. By developing industry-specific disclosure and data frameworks for
companies to use, the SEC could blunt criticisms that such new disclosure regulations are
unlikely to produce useful information.
Third, beyond newly-required KPIs or data points, the context in which companies view
those data should be provided. Rather than disclosing pages and pages of risks that are often
generic and boiler-plate, management should be required to disclose how they prioritize social
and environmental risks, and what strategic initiatives they have developed to respond to which
global trends they perceive as highest-priority. As with Management Discussion and Analysis,
what matters to investors and other stakeholders is how management is thinking about the
challenges facing a particular company, and how they are positioned to respond.
Finally, it may behoove the SEC in its regulatory design to think carefully about
connecting ESG data or KPIs to context-based reporting addressing the question: how do a
company’s efforts relate to the broader issues of system constraints? This type of reporting
cannot only be the responsibility of companies, since it will require scientists, policy-makers and
experts to identify those system constraints.
One approach which may connect ESG data (which looks at an individual firm) and its
systemic sustainability context is Integrated Reporting, a framework being developed by the
IIRC. Integrated Reporting is a “concise communication about how an organization’s
strategy, governance, performance and prospects . . . lead to the creation of value in the short,
medium and long term.” What is critical to this definition is the concept of “value,” which
the IIRC website defines as: “accountability and stewardship for the broad base of capitals
165
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[that companies rely upon to produce goods and services], (financial, manufactured,
intellectual, human, social relationship, and natural) and promote understanding of their
interdependencies.”166 The IIRC has recently entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
with IASB, the International Accounting Standards Board, author of IFRS, so work may be
proceeding to connect global financial accounting with broader “capitals accounting.”

IX. Conclusion
We thank the Commission for the invitation to discuss the need for mandatory
sustainability reporting. Corporate reporting requirements should not be structured to encourage
status quo interpretations of materiality over innovation or the recognition of societal,
environmental and economic changes occurring in the broader environment and in investors’
concerns. Markets that discourage innovation are destined to fall behind those that foster the
exchange of information that is forward-looking. What the Commission decides about
mandatory sustainability reporting will have a major impact on whether investors have the ability
to allocate capital to help create the future that we need, or whether they are limited to preserving
the past.
We would be happy to discuss any of the points raised in this letter with any of the
Commissioners or members of the SEC staff.
Sincerely,
Center for International Environmental Law
Center of Concern
Environmental Investigation Agency - Global
Foundation Earth
Friends of the Earth
Greenpeace - US
Rainforest Action Network
Sierra Club
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cc:
Commissioner Kara M. Stein
Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar
Mr. Keith Higgins, Division of Corporation Finance
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